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The new government in India led by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party has Issued a national agenda 
for governance. The agenda seems to suggest that for the first time India will be formally admitting to 
having nuclear weapons as opposed to the technology and other assets for developing them. This 
suggestion has been further qualified by another government announcement that the option to have 
nuclear weapons will be left open. Given the possible repercussions for an arms race with Pakistan, for 
strategic concerns of other declared nuclear powers, and for global concerns concerning nuclear 
proliferation--and given the informed opinion of most proliferation observers that India has already 
developed nuclear weapons-- one might wonder whether it is in India's interest to admit, deny, or 
deflect the truth. 
 
Purely from a philosophical point of view one might conclude that all observations are based somewhat 
on a priori assumptions that are stated as certainties. Thus there is no objective truth and perhaps no 
differential consequence among admitting, denying, and deflecting the truth. However, knowledge of 
events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki might well render this view point sheer sophistry. 
 
Some social psychologists have supported the hypothesis that individuals have more difficulty making 
inferences based on suppositions than on so-called factual premises. In this context, deflecting the truth 
as communication technique usually generates suppositions rather than factual premises and, thus, 
more difficulty in developing inferences. This difficulty might well be correlated with the recipient of 
deflection of truth communications having to hedge bets. Hedging bets might serve a deterrent function 
towards adversaries. Yet, a majority of political analysts of nuclear weapons probably would maintain 
that admitting the truth and generating factual premises were the linchpins of nuclear deterrence 
during the Cold War. 
 
Other social psychologists have supported the hypothesis that denying the truth of what already is 
known through attempting to keep the truth secret can actually increase cognitive accessibility of the 
truth among the deniers and those closely monitoring the deniers. If accurate, this hypothesis might 
imply that the choice among admitting, denying, and deflecting the truth is moot. 
 
Still other social psychologists have supported the hypothesis that repeated exposure to information 
enhances its rated truth--regardless of whether that information is true or false. Moreover, repeated 
truthful information is judged more credible than novel true information, while the relationship 
between repeated and novel false information is dependent on the time the comparison is made and 
feedback is given. As well, both actual and perceived repetition influenced the rated truth for true 
information, while only perceived repetition influenced false information. Thus, repetition--regardless of 
whether one is admitting, denying or deflecting the truth--may be a crucial component of the effects of 
one's communication about nuclear weapons capability. 
 
Just based on the above research, psychological guidance for Indian public affairs officers itself seems 
ambiguous. Following another alleged nuclear power--Israel--even the most nationalist of Indian leaders 
might do well to go with deflecting the truth. (See Brown, A.S., & Nix, L.A. (1996). Turning lies into truth: 
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Referential validation of falsehoods. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 22, 1088-1100; Burns, J.F. (March 19, 1998). Hindu party is candid on nuclear arms but not 
much else. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Byrne, R.M.J., Handley, S.J., & Johnson-Laird, 
P.N. (1995). Reasoning from suppositions. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Experimental Psychology, 48A, 915-944; Lane, J.D., & Wegner, D.M. (1995). The cognitive consequences 
of secrecy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 237-253; Montag, N. (1996). Mentira or 
verdade? Revista Brasileira de Psicanalise, 30, 323-328.) (Keywords: Deflection, India, Nuclear Weapons, 
Political Psychology, Truth.) 
 
 
2
International Bulletin of Political Psychology, Vol. 4, Iss. 11 [1998], Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol4/iss11/5
